through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space theje is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy wq can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things. " Again [he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. a?id XV. of the work " On Nature " and in the Larger Epitome], of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made. These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. a It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities. " Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. <Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else : b > hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit ; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite. '• Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-