tranquillity like its shadow : so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that : and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be remoyed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility ; according to others, gentleness. 5 Chapter 12. TIMON (c. 320-230 b.c.) Timon, says our c Apollonides of Nicaea in the first book of his commentaries On the SUU, which he dedicated to Tiberius Caesar, was the son of Timarchus and a native of Phlius. Losing his parents when young, he became a stage-dancer, but later nothing that we know of this Xicias tends to confirm such a conjecture. In favour of the translation adopted by most scholars it may be urged that Strabo calls the Stoics ol -rj/j-erepoi, just as Cicero calls the Academics " nostri." Even if we accept this meaning, " a Sceptic like myself," a further subtlety arises. Is I). L. here speaking in his own person or has he merely transcribed 6 trap ij/xwv from a monograph of a Sceptic ? Something may be urged on either side ; for reasons given in Introd. p. xiii, the former conjecture seems somewhat more probable.