Plut. Mor., Common Conceptions 42 — Of common conceptions, against the Stoics

Plut. Mor., Common Conceptions 42 — Of common conceptions, against the Stoics, Plutarch; served verbatim

DIADUMENUS. These men’s conception therefore of time is not unlike the grasping of water, which, the harder it is held, all the more slides and runs away. As to actions and motions, all evidence is utterly confounded. For if now is divided into past and future, it is of necessity that what is now moved partly has been moved and partly shall be moved, that the end and beginning of motion have been taken away, that nothing of any work has been done first, nor shall any thing be last, the actions being distributed with time. For as they say that of present time, part is past and part to come; so of that which is doing, it will be said that part is done and part shall be done. When therefore had to dine, to write, to walk, a beginning, and when shall they have an end, if every one who is dining has dined and shall dine, and every one who is walking has walked and shall walk? But this is, as it is said, of all absurdities the most absurd, that if he who now lives has already lived and shall live, then to live neither had beginning nor shall have end; but every one of us, as it seems, was born without beginning to live, and shall die without ceasing to live. For if there is no last part, but he who lives has something of the present still remaining for the future, to say Socrates shall live will never be false so long as it shall be true to say Socrates lives; and so long also will be false to say Socrates is dead. So that, if Socrates shall live is true in infinite parts of time, it will in no part of time be true to say Socrates is dead. And verily what end will there be of a work, and where will you terminate an action, if, as often as it is true to say This is doing, it is likewise true to say This shall be doing? For he will lie who shall say, there will be an end of Plato’s writing and disputing; since Plato will never give over writing and disputing, if it is never false to say of him who disputes that he shall dispute, and of him who writes that he shall write. Moreover, there will be no part of that which now is, but either has been or is to be, and is either past or future; but of what has been and is to be, of past and future, there is no sense; wherefore there is absolutely no sense of any thing. For we neither see what is past and future, nor do we hear or have any other sense of what has been or is to be. Nothing then, even what is present, is to be perceived by sense, if of the present, part is always future and part past,—if part has been and part is to be.

The Greek stands ready in the workroom; the English is served. Both faces will read together.

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Filed here — the addresses this episode attests; counted by the house’s first pass

Plato — a life Socrates — a candidate entry

Of common conceptions, against the Stoics, Plutarch — translated by Samuel White (rev. W. W. Goodwin), 1874
Apparatus shelf + pinned Perseus TEI — Plutarch's Morals (the Moralia), ed. William W. Goodwin, five volumes · 'Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by William W. Goodwin, Ph. D.', with an introduction by R. W. Emerson; Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1874 (five volumes; a minority of the TEI transcriptions were keyed from the same publisher's 1878 reprint)
license: public-domain (US: the Goodwin edition is an 1874 Boston publication of a 1684-1694 translation — title pages verified on all five shelf scans at acquisition; Perseus digital editions CC BY-SA 4.0, attribution recorded per ops/corpus-staging/SOURCES.md pattern)