When he thought the right time had come he drew out [the velites] to oppose those of the enemy who occupied the foot of the hills; while against those who had descended into the valley he led his main force from the camp in four cohorts, and attacked the infantry. Caius Laelius at the same time made a detour with the cavalry by the hills, which stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the enemy’s horse on the rear; and so kept them occupied with fighting him. The enemy’s infantry therefore, being thus deprived of the support of the cavalry, on which they had relied in descending into the valley, were distressed and overmatched in the battle; while their cavalry was in much the same plight: for, being surprised on ground of insufficient extent, they fell into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each other than by the hands of the enemy; for their own infantry was pressing upon their flank, and the enemy’s infantry on their front, while his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having taken this course, the result was that nearly all those who had descended into the valley lost their lives; while those who had been stationed on the foot of the hills managed to escape. These last were the light-armed troops, and formed about a third of the whole army: with whom Andobales himself contrived to make good his escape to a certain stronghold of great security.... By further operations in this year, B.C. 206, Scipio had compelled Mago to abandon Spain: and towards the winter the Roman army went into winter-quarters at Tarraco. Having thus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in Iberia, Scipio arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, bringing with him the materials of a brilliant triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for his country. But being anxious to arrive in Rome before the consular elections, he arranged for the government of Iberia, and, having put the army into the hands of Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked with Caius Laelius and his other friends for Rome....