ward from one to the next in order, it is possible 1>\ sueh a progression to arrive in thought at infinity." " We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended, 6 nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space ; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by \irtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes : there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater ; fewer of\hem, if the magnitude measured is less. '• We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom ; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude ; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest c things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being c i.e. " uncompounded." But v. Arnim's duepn, " void of parts," is more suitable.