of what is neither good nor evil ; courage a as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent ; justice . . . ; magnanimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally ; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent ; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment ; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests. Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate : e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary ; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge. Good in general is that from which some advantage comes, and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good in these three senses — viz. as being (1) the source from which benefit results ; or (2) that in respect of which benefit results, e.g. the virtuous act ; or (3) that by the agency of which benefit results, e.g. the good man who partakes in virtue. Another particular definition of good which they give is " the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational." To this answers virtue and, as being £01