Fabius declz"nes I-Iannibal's oper oj Battle.-The Dictator took over the consul's army from Fulvius Flaccus, the second in command, and marched through Sabine territory to Tibur, where he had ordered the newly raised force to assemble by the appointed day. From there he advanced to Praeneste, and taldng a cross-country route, came out on the Latin road. Fronl this point he proceeded towards the enemy, showing the utmost care in reconnoitring all the various routes, and determined not to take any risks any\vhere, except so far as necessity should cOll1pel hiln. The first day he pitched his camp in view of the enemy not far from Arpi; the Carthaginian lost no time in marching out his men in battle order to give him the chance of fighting. But when he saw that the enenlY kept perfectly quiet and that there \vere no signs of excitement in their camp, he tauntingly remarked that the spirits of the Romans, those sons of 11ars, were broken at last, the .war was at an end) and they had openly foregone all claim to valour and renown. He then returned into camp. But he ,vas really in a very anxious state of mind, for he saw that he \vould have to do with a very different type of commander from Flaminius or Sempronius; the Romans had been taught by their defeats and had at last found a general who was a match for him. It was the wariness not the impetuosity of the Dictator 4 that was the immediate cause of his alarm; he had not yet tested his inflexible resolution. He began to harass and provoke him by frequently shifting his camp and fa vitging the fields of the allies of Rome before his very eyes. Sometimes he would In arch rapidly out of sight and then in some turn of the road take up a concealed position in the hope of entrapping him, should he come down to level ground. Fabius kept on high ground, at a moderate distance from the enemy, so that he never lost sight of hinl and never closed with him. Unless they \vere employed on necessary duty, the soldiers were confined to calnp. When they went in .quest of wood or forage they ,vent in large bodies and only within prescribed limits. A force of cava]ry and light infantry told off in readiness against sudden alarlTIS, made everything .safe for his own soldiers and dangerous for the scattered foragers .of the enemy. He refused to stake everything on a general .engagement, whilst slight encounters, fought on safe ground with a retreat close at hand, encouraged his men, who had been demoralised by their previous defeats, and made them less dissatisfied \vith their own courage and fortunes. But his sound and commonsense tactics were not more distasteful to Hannibal than they were to his own l\1aster of the Horse. Headstrong and impetuous in counsel and with an ungovernable tongue, the only thing that prevented Minucius from making shipwreck of the State was the {act that he \vas in a subordinate command. At first to a few listeners, after\vards openly amongst the rank and file, he abused Fabius, caning his deliberation indolence and his caution cowardice, attributing to hiln faults akin to rus real virtues, and by disparaging his superior-a vile practice which, through its often proving successful, is steadily on the increase-he tried to exalt himself. :