The Roman army was at the time in the neighbour-hood of Larinum, with Minucius in command, owing, as stated above, to the Dictator having left for the City. The camp had been situated in a lofty and secure position; it was now transferred to the plain, and more energetic measures more in harmony with the general's temperament were being discussed; suggestions were made for an attack either on the dispersed parties of foragers or on the camp now that it was left with a weak guard. Hannibal soon found out that the tactics of his enemies had changed with the change of generals, and that they would act with more spirit than prudence, and incredible as it may sound, though his enemy was in closer proximity to him, he sent out a whole division of his army to collect corn, keeping the other two in camp. The next thing he did was to move his camp still nearer the enemy, about two miles from Gereonium on rising ground within view of the Romans, so that they might know that he was determined to protect his foragers in case of attack. From this position he was able to see another elevated position still closer to the Roman camp, in fact looking down on it. There was no doubt that if he were to attempt to seize it in broad daylight the enemy, having less distance to go, would be there before him, so he sent a force of Numidians ho occupied it during the night. The next day the Romans, seeing how small a number were holding the position, made short work of them and drove them off and then transferred their own camp there. By this time there was but a very small distance between rampart and rampart, and even that was almost entirely filled with Roman troops, who were demonstrating in force to conceal the movements of cavalry and light infantry who had been sent through the camp gate farthest from the enemy 8 to attack his foragers, upon whom they inflicted severe losses. Hannibal did not venture upon a regular battle because his camp was so weakly guarded that it could not have repelled an assault. Borrowing the tactics of Fabius he began to carry on the campaign by remaining in almost complete inaction, and withdrew his camp to its former position before the waHs of Gereonium. According to some authors a pitched battle was fought with both armies in regular formation; the Carthaginians were routed at the first onset and driven to their camp; from there a sudden sortie was made and it was the Romans' turn to flee, and the battle was once more restored by the sudden appearance of Numerius Decimus, the Samnite general. Decimus was, as far as wealth and lineage go, the foremost man not only in Bovianum, his native place, but in the whole of Samnium. In obedience to the Dictator's orders he was bringing into camp a force of 8000 foot and 500 horse, and when he appeared in Hannibal's rear both sides thought that it was a reinforcement coming from Rome under Q. Fabius. Hannibal, it is further stated, ordered his men to retire, the Romans followed them up, and with the aid of the Samnites captured two of their fortified positions the same day; 6000 of the enemy were killed and about 50 0 of the Romans, yet though the losses were so evenly balanced an idle and foolish report of a splendid victory reached Rome together with a despatch from the Master of the Horse which was still more foolish.